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1  Introduction 
 
While corporate tax rates in the European Union have fallen since the early 1980s, the 
share of corporate tax revenue in GDP has increased during this period. Some explanations 
have been put forward for these diverging developments. For instance, policy reforms have 
been accompanied by a broadening of the tax base, which made up for the revenue loss from 
tax rate reductions. Yet, while base broadening policies may indeed explain part of corporate 
tax rate-revenue paradox, it is unlikely to be complete.  
This paper explores other explanations for the broadening of the corporate tax base 
that has occurred parallel to the lowering of tax rates. In particular, the reduction in corporate 
tax rates may have encouraged a shift of income from the personal towards the corporate tax 
base. One such response is through increased entrepreneurship. Indeed, to the extent that a 
lower corporate tax rate encourages people to become entrepreneur instead of employee, 
income will be shifted from labour income towards entrepreneurial income. This may broaden 
the corporate tax base. A second type of income shifting occurs through the choice of legal 
form of companies. Entrepreneurs face a choice between a (closely held) corporation and 
other legal forms of doing business, such as the (sole) proprietorship. Lower corporate tax 
rates may have induced them to switch to the corporate form, which then broadens the 
corporate tax base. 
US evidence suggests that income shifting between personal and corporate tax bases is 
indeed significant (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000; Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1994; MacKie-
Mason and Gordon, 1997; Goolsbee, 1998; 2004). For Europe, such evidence is scarce.1 This 
paper contributes to the literature by empirically exploring income shifting in Europe. 
Thereby, we analyze the two channels of income shifting discussed above, i.e. the choice of 
entrepreneurship and the choice of legal form. We use panel data from Eurostat on indicators 
for entrepreneurship and the share of the corporate sector in total business activity. Data are 
available for 20 European countries, 60 sectors and a maximum coverage of six years between 
1998 and 2003. 
Income shifting between personal and corporate taxes may have important 
implications for corporate tax policy in Europe. In particular, policy-makers may not worry 
too much about tax competition as long as the decline in corporate tax rates does not lead to a 
                                                 
1 An exception is Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) who explore the share of corporate savings in total private 
savings in the OECD. 
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fall in corporate tax revenues. However, if income shifting between personal and corporate 
tax revenue is a major driving force for stable corporate tax receipts, then tax competition will 
not erode corporate but personal tax revenue. It would then imply that there is reason to worry 
about tax competition, since lower corporate tax rates do erode the financial basis of the 
public sector and of its redistributive policies in particular. Indeed, tax competition then 
erodes the role of the corporate tax as a backstop for the personal income tax, with important 
implications for total public revenue. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section (2) elaborates in more detail on the 
paradox of falling corporate tax rates and rising corporate tax revenues in the European Union 
over the past decades. Section (3) formulates our predictions on income shifting between 
personal and corporate tax bases as an explanation for this paradox and elaborates on existing 
empirical evidence. Section (4) describes the data that we use to test our hypotheses on 
income shifting. Section (5) presents our empirical analysis and discusses the implications of 
income shifting for the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. Finally, section (6) concludes. 
 
2. The corporate tax rate-revenue paradox 
2.1 The negative relationship between corporate tax rates and revenues 
During the past two decades, statutory corporate tax rates in Europe have fallen 
considerably. Figure 2.1 illustrates this. It shows the development of the average statutory 
corporate tax rate in the European Union between 1985 and 2006. We see that the average tax 
rate has dropped in the EU-15 from slightly below 50% in 1985 to 30% in 2006.  
The decline in corporate tax rates has induced fears of a race-to-the-bottom in the 
European Union, i.e. a process in which competing governments successively undercut each 
others tax rates in order to attract mobile tax bases.2 This could ultimately erode corporate tax 
revenues and impose a threat to the financing of the European welfare states. Such fears for 
tax competition have been reinforced recently by the accession of ten new Member States 
(NMS). Indeed, these countries apply corporate tax rates that have gradually reached levels of 
more than 10%-points lower than in the EU-15 countries (figure 2.1). 
 
                                                 
2 See Nicodème (2006) for a review of the literature on tax competition. Note that the incentive for 
undercutting each others tax rates is counterbalanced by the incentive to export taxes in light of a growing 
share of foreign ownership of domestic firms, see Huizinga and Nicodème (2006). 
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of statutory corporate income tax rates in the European Union. 
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Figure 2.2: Corporate income tax in percentage of GDP. 
Taxes on corporations as percentage of GDP (1980-2004)
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Source: European Commission. Measures are GDP-weighted. 
 
Despite the reduction in corporate tax rates, corporate tax revenues have maintained 
remarkably stable over the past decades. Figure 2.2 shows the development of corporate tax 
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revenue as a share of GDP during 1980 and 2004 for the European Union. We see that this 
corporate income tax-to-GDP ratio is volatile as it is heavily influenced by the business cycle. 
The trend in figure 2.2 suggests, however, that the ratio has remained stable since 1980 for the 
EU-15 and actually increased somewhat during the last decade.  
 
Figure 2.3: Relationship between corporate tax to GDP ratio and the statutory rate. 
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Source: European Commission and Structures of taxation systems. 
 
While trends suggest an inverse relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate 
tax revenue over time, this relationship is also present in a cross-section of European 
countries. Indeed, countries featuring a relatively high corporate tax rate tend to collect 
relatively little corporate tax revenue.3 Figure 2.3 plots pairs of the tax rate and the corporate 
tax-to-GDP ratio between 1985 and 2004 for 14 old EU Member States (EU-15 minus 
Luxembourg). A simple regression suggests that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1%-
point is accompanied by a fall in corporate tax-to-GDP ratio by 0.0319 (t-stats are reported 
between brackets). 
 
 
                                                 
3 If we correlate for 14 EU countries (EU-15 minus Luxembourg) the statutory corporate tax rate with the 
corporate tax to GDP ratio, we find a negative correlation for most of the years between 1985 and 2004. On 
average for this period, the correlation is – 0.13.  
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2.2 A decomposition of the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio 
The negative correlation points to a paradox between rate and revenue. Apparently, 
the corporate tax base has broadened, which made up for the revenue loss from rate reduction. 
A growing number of studies try to understand the origins of this base broadening (Devereux 
et al., 2004; Weichenrieder, 2005; Sørensen, 2006). Below, we follow this literature in 
describing trends in the components of the corporate tax base. In particular, we divide the 
corporate tax-to-GDP ratio into three components: 
GDP
TPEx
TPE
TCPx
TCP
CTR
GDP
CTR =               (2.1) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (2.1) reflects corporate tax revenue (CTR) as a 
share of total gross operating profit of corporations (TCP). It provides a rough measure for the 
implicit tax on corporations. The second term measures total corporate profits as a share of 
total gross operating profit in the economy (TPE). It reflects the share of the corporate sector 
in the economy. The final term reflects total business income as a share of GDP. Figure 2.4 
contains charts that describe for 12 European countries the development of the tax-to-GDP 
ratio and its three underlying components in (2.1).4 These graphs reveal that the three 
components have evolved in diverse ways between countries.  
• The implicit taxes feature a fairly stable development in most countries. Exceptions 
are the UK and Poland, which show a decline; Spain and Finland show an increase.  
• Most countries show a gradual rise in the degree of incorporation, including Germany, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Denmark. Italy and Spain 
show an opposite development.5 
• The rate of total profit in the economy features a fairly stable development in most 
countries, although it has increased somewhat in France, Austria and Finland.  
The diverse developments make it difficult to arrive at a single explanation for the 
rate-revenue paradox in corporate taxation in Europe. Below, we discuss each of the three 
components at the aggregate European level. 
                                                 
4 Sørensen (2006) adopts a similar approach, but considers only seven European countries. Our source is the 
AMECO database from the European Commission. 
5 Weichenrieder (2005) shows longer time series for Austria and Germany. In Austria, corporate share increased 
from 50% in the mid 1970s to 75% today. In Germany, it rose from less than 40% to around 55%. 
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Figure 2.4: Corporate Income Tax on GDP and its components. 
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United Kingdom
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2.3 Base broadening policies 
The first term in (2.1) stands for the implicit tax on corporate income. Figure 2.5 
shows its development according to the European Commission based on revenue statistics. 
The figure presents the GDP-weighted average for the EU between 1995 and 2003. We see 
that the implicit tax on corporate income in the EU-15 has increased between 1995 and 2001, 
but declined in 2002 and 2003. The development in the new member states was more volatile.  
Figure 2.5: Implicit tax rate on corporate income. 
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Source: Structure of taxation systems. Slovakia excluded from average for NMS-10. GDP-weighted averages. 
 
One reason for the stable development of implicit tax rates observed in Figures 2.4 
and 2.5 is that corporate tax rate reductions have been accompanied by base broadening 
policies in most countries, e.g. by means of reduced investment tax credits, loss offset rules, 
interest deductibility and fiscal depreciation6. Figure 2.6 provides ground for this latter policy 
development. It shows the arithmetic mean for 13 European countries (EU-15 minus 
Luxembourg and Denmark) for the net present value (NPV) of fiscal depreciation allowances 
                                                 
6  In the US, Auerbach (2006) examines the role of losses in explaining the rise in the implicit tax rate on 
corporations. 
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in terms of the price of investment.7 The figure reveals that fiscal depreciation rules have 
indeed become less generous during the past two decades, especially for buildings.8 
Figure 2.6: Net Present Value of Fiscal Depreciation in the European Union. 
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Source: http://www.ifs.org.uk/data/internationaltaxdata.zip 
NPV measures as arithmetic mean for 13 EU countries (base case for plant & machinery). 
 
The question is whether policies of base broadening provide a complete explanation 
for the negative correlation between corporate tax revenue and corporate tax rates. We argue 
that this is unlikely. To show this, we consider the development of effective tax rates, which 
can be computed along the lines of King and Fullerton (1984).9 The IFS has computed both 
the effective marginal (EMTR) and average (EATR) tax rates on corporate investment.10 If 
policies of base broadening and rate reduction would have been revenue-neutral ex-ante, we 
expect the EMTR to rise and the EATR to fall for more profitable investments. The reason is 
that fiscal depreciation rules and other measures determining the tax base typically apply to 
the margin of new investment but not to the extraordinary profits. In contrast, the corporate 
                                                 
7 These computations are carried out by the IFS (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2002; Griffith and Klemm, 2004). If 
investment could be expensed against corporate profits (as under a cash-flow tax), the measure of NPV would be 
100%. It is lower than 100% if fiscal depreciation rules are less generous, which is what figure 2.6 reveals. 
8 Also in a cross-section of countries, we observe a negative correlation between the tax base and the tax rate. 
Indeed, the correlation between the statutory tax rate and the NPV-measure for plants and machinery suggests an 
average correlation of 0.17 for the years 1982 – 2005 (a higher NPV-measure denotes a narrower base). 
9 See Nicodème (2001) and Sørensen (2004) for an overview of different effective tax rate measures. 
10 The EMTR measures the tax burden at the margin of new investment, i.e. with a return that matches the cost 
of investment. The EATR measures the tax on investments that earn an above normal return, i.e. an economic 
rent. 
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tax rate applies to both the normal return and the profit. Hence, a revenue-neutral reform 
characterized by base broadening and rate reduction comes down to a shift from a tax on 
extraordinary profits towards the marginal return on investment. This will reduce the EATR 
but raise the EMTR. Figure 2.7 shows developments of the EATR and the EMTR between 
1982 and 2005. 
 
Figure 2.7: Evolution of Effective Marginal and Average Tax rates in Europe. 
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Arithmetic mean of EMTR (base case) and EATR (with 40% economic rent) for 13 EU countries 
 
We observe that the EATR has gradually declined in Europe during the past two 
decades, in line with the fall in statutory rates. At the same time, the EMTR has fallen as well, 
albeit less substantially due to base broadening.11 This suggests that base broadening is 
unlikely to have been sufficient to make up for the ex-ante revenue losses from rate reduction. 
Indeed, base broadening has probably only compensated partly for the revenue effects from 
rate reduction. Therefore, other explanations for the corporate tax rate-revenue paradox need 
to be explored. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Base broadening through the less generous accelerated depreciation implies that corporate tax is collected 
earlier. The structural revenue gains show up in reduced interest payments, rather than higher corporate tax 
revenue. This provides further doubt on the effects of base broadening on the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. 
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2.4 The size of the corporate sector 
The second term on the right hand side of (2.1) reflects the corporate share of total 
pre-tax profit in the economy. The developments of these shares for individual European 
countries in the graphs of Figure 2.4 suggest that a growing degree of incorporation may well 
explain part of the broadening of the corporate tax base in Europe.  
An important question from a tax-policy perspective is whether this growth in the 
corporate share of business income has been caused by reductions in the corporate tax rate, or 
that other non-tax factors are responsible for it. Indeed, if the shifting from personal to 
corporate income would be the result from lower corporate income tax rates (induced by tax 
competition), the revenue consequences of this will not show up in corporate tax revenues but 
in personal tax revenues. This will shed new light on the tax competition debate as the adverse 
revenue implications of tax competition can be more severe than when only corporate tax 
revenues are considered. It also relates to the fundamental reason for the existence of the 
corporate tax, which is to serve as a backstop for the personal income tax (see e.g. De Mooij 
(2005), Weichenrieder (2005), Sørensen (2006)). To the extent that tax competition drives 
down corporate tax rates, it undermines this backstop function.  
The rest of this paper explores this question in more detail. In particular, we analyze to 
what extent a lower corporate tax rate induces a shift of business income from the personal 
tax base (applying to sole proprietorships) to the corporate tax base (applying to limited 
liability firms) by affecting the share of business that operates under the corporate legal 
form.12  
 
2.5 The business income share 
The third term on the right hand side of expression (2.1) stands for pre-tax profitability 
in the economy. The graphs in figure 2.4 suggest that this share has increased for some but 
not all countries. These diverse developments can have different backgrounds. For instance, 
for an individual country, a lower corporate tax rate may attract foreign direct investment and 
profits of multinational companies. This would endogenously broaden the corporate tax base. 
However, a broader tax base in one country should then be accompanied by a smaller tax base 
                                                 
12  Devereux et al. (2004) and Auerbach (2006) mention the rising share of the financial sector in the economy as 
another potential explanation for the growing share of the corporate sector. This paper does not aim at explaining 
the rise in the corporate tax base, but focuses on the extent to which lower corporate tax rates have affected this 
share via entrepreneurship and incorporation. Therefore, we pay no further attention to sectoral restructuring. 
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in another country. On balance, we should thus observe a shift in profit income between 
countries, not a rise in overall business income.  
What happened to profitability across-the-board? Figure 2.8 shows the development of 
profit income for the EU as a whole during the last decade. It shows a slight fall in 
profitability during the late 1990s, but an increase since 2000. As this is precisely a period of 
rapidly declining corporate tax rates (see Figure 2.1), it fuels suspicion that changes in 
business income may also be related to the corporate tax rate.  
 
Figure 2.8: Evolution of profitability in the European Union. 
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Source: AMECO. Profitability is defined as the ratio of the gross operating surplus in the economy on GDP. 
Averages are GDP-weighted. 
 
As with the degree of incorporation, the question is thus whether changes in the share 
of business income in the economy have been caused by corporate tax cuts or that other 
trends, such as ongoing economic integration, are responsible for it. We explore this question 
by analyzing the impact of corporate taxes on entrepreneurship. In particular, people in the 
workforce face a choice to undertake economic activities as an employee or as an 
entrepreneur. Wage income of employees is taxed under the personal tax, while business 
income can be taxed under the corporate tax if the entrepreneur chooses to incorporate. Thus, 
a positive impact of corporate taxation on entrepreneurship would cause a rise in the share of 
business income in the economy and, thereby, a broadening of the corporate tax base.  
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3. Corporate taxation and income shifting 
This section develops a model in which individuals take two successive decisions. 
First, they choose whether or not to become entrepreneur, thereby leaving open the legal form 
in which they would do business. If they become entrepreneur, they decide in the second step 
about the legal form of doing business, i.e. the corporate or non-corporate form. 
 
3.1 Taxation and entrepreneurship: theoretical predictions 
Taxation may affect the choice of starting a business.13 To understand this 
relationship, we develop a simple model of entrepreneurship. Suppose an individual can earn 
a certain income Ye if he decides to occupy regular employment. This income will be taxed 
under the personal income tax (Tp), which can depend on the level of income, i.e. ∂Tp / ∂Y > 0. 
Utility at income (1-Tp)Ye equals: 
 
Ue = u[(1-Tp)Ye]   (3.1) 
 
The individual can alternatively become an entrepreneur. There are three major differences 
between the income as an employee and the income undertaken as a business: 
• Self-employment income involves more uncertainty as entrepreneurship is more risky 
than other occupations.14 The expected income of the individual as an entrepreneur is 
denoted by E(Yb), where Yb has a density function φ(.) between minimal income Yb0 
and the maximum level Yb1. 
• Entrepreneurial income may be taxed differently. If the company is organized as a sole 
proprietorship, income is taxed under the personal income tax Tp. If it organized as a 
(closely held) corporation, it is taxed under the corporate income tax, denoted by Tc. In 
principle, also Tc may depend on the level of income, Yb, if the tax system is non-
linear. A potential entrepreneur might not know ex-ante what the future legal form of 
                                                 
13 Entrepreneurial activity may generate positive spillovers via the development of new technologies, new 
products and higher productivity in the economy. This can provide a rationale for subsidies on entrepreneurship 
through the tax system. This paper does not consider externalities from entrepreneurship as our focus is on 
income shifting, rather than other aspects of entrepreneurship. 
14 For instance, fixed wage contracts insure workers against shocks in productivity, e.g. due to business cycle 
developments. Indeed, Guiso et al. (2005) show that firms are an important vehicle of the insurance provision for 
the worker. The self-employed bear these risks themselves. 
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the business will be. For instance the entrepreneur may start non-corporate (so as to 
deduct losses against other incomes) and decide to incorporate at a later stage (to 
benefit from lower taxes in the corporate form). This option to incorporate should be 
taken into account when deciding about starting a business. We denote the expected 
business income tax as: αTp + (1-α)Tc, where α = 1 if the business would be run in the 
non-corporate form and α = 0 if it were run in the corporate form. A value of 0 < α < 1 
reflects the option value to incorporate. Expected after-tax income from business 
equals [α(1-Tp) + (1-α)(1-Tc)] E(Yb).  
• Self employment can provide tax sheltering opportunities. For instance, it can be 
easier to underreport self-employment income than wage income. Moreover, there are 
usually legal opportunities to deduct business-related consumption from the tax bill. 
We assume that a business provides tax shelter for a fixed amount S. Hence, the 
entrepreneur saves [αTp + (1-α)Tc] S on her/his tax bill as compared to receiving wage 
income.  
The expected utility of the entrepreneur is equal to: 
 
Ub = E (u{[α(1-Tp) + (1-α)(1-Tc)] Yb + [αTp + (1-α)Tc] S})  (3.2) 
 
Arbitrage implies that an individual will start a business if his expected utility from 
entrepreneurship in (3.2) exceeds the utility from employment in (3.1), i.e. Ub > Ue. Assume 
that utility is characterized by u(Y) = Y γ, where γ ≤ 1 denotes the coefficient of risk aversion. 
The individual will choose entrepreneurship if: 
 
[(1-Tp)Ye] γ   <   ∫
1
0
b
b
Y
Y
{[α(1-Tp) + (1-α)(1-Tc)] φ(Yb) + [αTp + (1-α)Tc] S} γ dYb (3.3) 
 
In the absence of taxation (Tp = Tc = 0), entrepreneurship will be chosen by individuals 
whose expected utility from self-employment, ∫{φ(Yb)}γdYb, exceeds that from an ordinary 
occupation, Ye γ. Risk plays an important role in this decision. In particular, if agents are risk 
neutral (γ = 1), they would simply compare the expected entrepreneurial income E(Yb) with 
the income from an occupation Ye. If agents are risk averse (γ < 1), the expected utility from 
entrepreneurial income on the right hand side of (3.3) declines with the variance of Yb. 
Accordingly, a higher risk of entrepreneurship reduces the likelihood that an individual 
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engages in self-employment. Indeed, the riskier entrepreneurship becomes, the higher is the 
risk premium that individuals require to engage in it.  
Taxes can affect the decision regarding entrepreneurship in (3.3) in four different 
ways.15  
• Option to incorporate. Unlike employees, entrepreneurs have the option to be taxed 
under the corporate regime, rather than the personal tax regime. If the corporate 
income tax is below the personal income tax, this option is valuable. It can thus affect 
the incentive for agents to engage in entrepreneurial activity since only business and 
not wage income can be shifted. Indeed, the larger is the personal tax relative to the 
corporate tax, the more attractive is entrepreneurship relative to other occupations. 
• Tax shelter advantage. Entrepreneurship provides a tax shelter advantage (S), which 
induces incentives to engage in a business. This advantage rises with the tax that 
applies to the entrepreneurial income. Thus, a higher level of the personal or corporate 
income tax raises entrepreneurship.  
• Tax as an insurance device. Taxes may affect entrepreneurship through their effect on 
risk taking. If households are risk neutral, a proportional income tax Tc = Tp would 
have no impact on risk taking (see (3.3) with γ = 1). If households are risk-averse, 
taxes may encourage risk taking as they reduce the variance in the after-tax 
entrepreneurial income in (3.3) and therefore the risk premium (the Domar-Musgrave 
effect). Thus, high personal or corporate taxes could increase the incentive for people 
to start a business on account of an insurance effect of taxes.  
• Tax progression effect. The positive effect of income taxes on risk taking might not 
apply if income tax systems are non-linear. For instance, if the income tax is 
progressive, losses can be offset at lower rates than business profits are taxed. 
Moreover, if income tax systems provide limits to loss offset (losses do not lead to 
negative taxes), successful companies face a higher effective taxation than 
unsuccessful ones. Such non-linearities lower the expected after-tax return from taking 
risk and will therefore discourage entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
15 We ignore the effect of income taxes on hours worked. This is sometimes mentioned in the literature as a 
negative impact of taxation on entrepreneurship. The reason why we ignore it is that this effect applies to 
workers and entrepreneurs alike and, therefore, does not affect the decision to engage in an ordinary job versus 
self employment.  
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From (3.3), we can derive the share of entrepreneurs in the workforce, given the 
distribution of Yb’s among individuals (as entrepreneurial skills are heterogeneous). The 
model yields some predictions regarding the impact of taxation on the share of 
entrepreneurship, although these predictions are sometimes ambiguous due to offsetting 
effects. This holds in particular for the corporate tax, which is our main variable of interest. 
Moreover, all predictions from the model are valid for given φ(Yb) and Ye. Yet, for the share 
of entrepreneurship, the levels of φ(Yb) and Ye may depend on general equilibrium effects 
induced by tax changes. This can indirectly affect the incentives for entrepreneurship. For 
instance, corporate and personal taxes may affect large and small companies differently, 
especially because larger firms generally show a higher degree of incorporation. Hence, the 
difference between personal and corporate taxes may reduce self-employment as it creates a 
competitive disadvantage for small firms relative to larger companies. Such general 
equilibrium mechanisms render the impact of both personal and corporate taxes on 
entrepreneurship even more ambiguous. Empirical evidence should therefore guide us on 
which effect dominates. 
 
3.2 Taxation and entrepreneurship: empirical evidence 
In our empirical analysis, we will explore the effect of tax variables on alternative 
indicators for entrepreneurship (ENTR). In particular, we estimate: 
 
ENTR =   α0 + + α1 Tp + α2 RIP + α3 Tc + α4 X + ε    (3.4) 
 
Expression (3.4) contains the tax on personal income (Tp), the ratio of tax progression 
(RIP) and the tax on corporate income (Tc). The RIP is defined as
a
m
T
T
−
−
1
1
, where Tm denotes 
the marginal tax rate on personal income and Ta stands for the average tax on personal 
income. A smaller RIP thus implies a more progressive tax system. We also adopt various 
control variables (X) that can affect entrepreneurship, such as the functioning of the capital 
market, and the administrative costs of starting a business. Our main variable of interest is the 
corporate tax, i.e. the coefficient α3. 
The estimation of (3.4) fits to the empirical literature on taxation and entrepreneurship, 
which has primarily focussed on US data. We briefly discuss the main findings from this 
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literature.16 First, there exists a large literature on the impact of personal income taxes on 
entrepreneurship, which is usually measured by the rate of self-employment, e.g. the number 
of self-employed in terms of the workforce. Some studies also use data on entrepreneurial 
entry (see e.g. Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; Bruce and Gurley, 2004; Fossen and Steiner, 
2006). The earlier studies using time-series data generally conclude that higher personal 
income tax rates encourage entrepreneurship. This is explained by the tax shelter advantage of 
self-employment (Long, 1982; Blau, 1987; Parker, 1996; Cowling and Mitchell, 1997; 
Robson, 1998). Using individual data of personal income tax returns, Cullen and Gordon 
(2002) also report a positive effect, but find that this is especially due to the impact of taxes 
on risk taking. More recent studies, based on cross-sectional or panel data, have been less 
conclusive on the tax effect on entrepreneurship (Bruce, 2000, 2002; Gentry and Hubbard, 
2000; Schuetze, 2000; Carroll et al., 2001; Parker and Robson, 2003; Bruce and Mohsin, 
2006). In particular, some studies report positive and others negative effects. Georgellis and 
Wall (2006) and Garrett and Wall (2006) argue that the relationship between personal income 
taxes and entrepreneurship might in fact be U-shaped: small and high levels of income taxes 
encourage entrepreneurship. They indeed find evidence for this non-linear relationship, 
although results are not always significant. Overall, the literature leaves us with an ambiguous 
picture on the effect of personal income taxes on entrepreneurship. Less ambiguity is found 
for the degree of progression in the income tax schedule, which generally tends to discourage 
entrepreneurship (Robson and Wren, 1999; Gentry and Hubbard, 2000 and 2004). This is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions based on the risk taking effect.  
The focus in our study is on the corporate tax. There are fewer studies considering the 
impact of corporate taxes on entrepreneurship than on personal income taxes. The available 
evidence on corporate taxes is also mixed. First, Robson (1998) uses time series data for the 
UK to explore -- among a large set of variables -- the impact of the small business' corporate 
tax rate on the rate of self-employment. He reports a positive but statistically insignificant 
effect. Cullen and Gordon (2002) use their individual data on self-employment to estimate the 
effect of corporate taxes. They find a positive effect on account of the risk-taking effect, 
which outweighs the negative impact via income shifting. Bruce and Mohsin (2006) use time 
series data for the US to explore the impact of corporate taxes on the rate of self-employment. 
They report a negative effect for some but not all indicators of entrepreneurship. The effect 
                                                 
16 See Bruce and Schuetze (2004) for an overview. Some studies also analyze capital gains taxes and 
entrepreneurship (Poterba, 1989) or the role of wealth taxes (Hansson, 2005), which we ignore in our estimation. 
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for the corporate tax appears to be rather small though. Garrett and Wall (2006) use a panel 
for 50 US states during the 1990s to estimate the effect of corporate taxes on 
entrepreneurship, measured as the share of the working-age population in proprietorships. 
They report a large negative impact that is, however, not significant at the 5% confidence 
level. In section 5, we will present our regressions results for expression (3.4) to explore the 
relationship between tax variables and entrepreneurship in the EU. 
 
3.3 Taxation and the choice of organisational form: theoretical predictions 
Once the decision to start a business has been made, entrepreneurs face a choice of 
legal form, i.e. the corporate versus non-corporate form. Taxation can affect this choice. To 
understand this, we propose a simple model along the lines of MacKie-Mason and Gordon 
(1997) and Goolsbee (1998; 2004). In the model, an entrepreneur earns income Yb by 
undertaking her/his economic activities. If she/he decides to run her/his business as a sole 
proprietorship, she/he will be taxed at the ordinary personal income tax Tp. Hence, net income 
will be: 
Ybnc = (1- Tp)Yb           (3.5) 
 
If the entrepreneur runs her/his business as a (closely held) corporation, her/his income 
will be taxed under the rules of the corporate tax system. Effectively, the corporate tax regime 
consists of the corporate income tax (Tb) plus the income tax that applies to either profit 
distributions or realized capital gains (Td), taking into account the possible double-tax relief. 
European countries adopt diverse regimes for dividend and capital gains taxation, which we 
will discuss in the next section. We denote the overall tax on business income in the corporate 
form by Tc, which equals Tc = Tb + β(1- Tb) Td, where β < 1 if a country provides double 
taxation relief through its integration system. In addition to income Yb, a business organized in 
the corporate form may collect non-tax benefits, denoted by B (or non-tax costs if B < 0). The 
non-tax benefits can be related to the limited liability of incorporation, which reduces the 
individual risk of doing business. Indeed, limited liability means that the entrepreneur does 
not risk his individual assets or income when taking part in the firm, since he is only liable for 
the capital invested in the company. Moreover, corporate businesses may have an advantage 
in attracting capital due of the public trading of shares. Non-tax costs can be related to capital 
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requirements and legal obligations for companies in the corporate form.17 The non-tax costs 
and benefits can be heterogeneous among companies. Assuming that the non-tax benefits or 
costs are untaxed, the overall net income from corporate business equals: 
 
Ybc = (1- Tc)Yb + B       (3.6) 
 
An entrepreneur facing the choice of organizational form will compare the respective 
after-tax incomes and decides to incorporate if Ybc > Ybnc. 18 This condition boils down to: 
 
B  >  (Tc – Tp)Yb           (3.7) 
 
Hence, the entrepreneur will choose the corporate form as long as the non-tax benefits 
exceed the net tax loss of the corporate form. The tax differential Tc – Tp thus measures the 
tax distortion on the organizational form of companies. From (3.7), we can derive the number 
of companies that will choose to incorporate. This will depend on the distribution of B across 
companies. In particular, if B would follow a uniform distribution across firms, then the 
relationship between the share of companies that chooses the corporate form and the tax 
difference would be linear. If B features a non-uniform distribution, then this relationship 
might be non-linear.  
 
3.4 Taxation and the choice of organisational form: empirical evidence 
In section 5, we estimate the following equation for the corporate share of business in 
the economy (CORP): 
 
CORP = β0 + β1 (Tp – Tc) + β2X + ε     (3.8) 
 
We expect a positive sign for β1. Apart from this linear equation, we will also explore 
alternative specifications. 
The effect of taxation on the division of business in the corporate versus non-corporate 
form has been analyzed in previous research for the United States. Gordon and MacKie-
                                                 
17 See Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) for a discussion of the non-tax costs and benefits of incorporation. 
18 In practice, there can be several exceptions to this dichotomy between sole proprietorships and corporations. 
For instance, some firms may have limited liability, but are still taxed under the non-corporate form. We ignore 
these exceptions in our analysis. 
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Mason (1994) use data on US firms between 1970 and 1986 to explore the importance of tax 
and non-tax factors in the choice of organisational form. They conclude that non-tax factors 
are considerably more important than taxes, implying that the efficiency cost of the tax 
distortion is relatively small. MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) use data on the corporate 
share of capital between 1959 and 1986 for the US and find that the tax differential between 
personal and corporate taxes exerts a significant effect on the corporate capital share, but only 
for firms that make positive profits. On aggregate, they find a very small effect. Thus, 
MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) conclude that non-tax factors are likely to be dominant in 
the choice of legal form by companies, rather than tax factors. Using similar time series data 
for the corporate share of capital between 1900 and 1939, Goolsbee (1998) reports a similar 
effect as Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997). 
Goolsbee (2004) argues that the earlier US studies might have problems in identifying 
the impact of taxes on organizational form since the time series variation in tax rates has been 
limited. Moreover, at the same time when tax rates were modified, other components of the 
tax system changed as well, which renders it difficult to identify the impact of the tax on 
organizational form. To allow for more variation in tax rates, Goolsbee (2004) adopts cross-
section data for US States and industries in the retail trade sector in 1992. He explores several 
indicators for the size of the corporate sector, including the share of companies, the 
employment share and sales. The estimates suggest a much larger impact of corporate taxes 
on the rate of incorporation: raising the corporate tax rate by .1 reduces the corporate share of 
firms by 0.25 and the corporate share of sales and employment by 0.07 to 0.15. 
Studies for Europe are scarce. One exception is Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002), who 
explore the impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the division of interest income 
between the corporate and non-corporate sector for 17 OECD countries between 1985 and 
1997. They find that the difference in tax rates exerts a significant and strong effect on the 
share of corporate savings in total savings. Alstadsæter (2003) explores income shifting under 
the Norwegian split model, which is part of the dual income tax system. She shows that the 
corporate organisational form serves as a tax shelter for high income entrepreneurs under the 
split model. While she provides time series evidence for Norway that is consistent with 
income shifting towards the corporate form, she does not explicitly estimate the impact of 
taxes on incorporation. 
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4. Data 
This section demonstrates our data used in the estimations for entrepreneurship and 
legal form. The appendix provides more information on the precise data sources and 
definitions. 
4.1 Entrepreneurship 
To construct our indicators for entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial entry, we use data 
from Eurostat on business demography in Europe for 20 European countries, 6 years between 
1998 and 2003 and 60 sectors on the number of active companies and the number of firm 
births (see Schrör, 2005, for a description). The active firms reflect all enterprises that carry 
out a business with a positive turnover and/or employment. A firm birth amounts to the 
creation of a new firm and excludes entries due to mergers, break-ups or a restructuring of an 
enterprise. Hence, a firm birth occurs when an enterprise starts an activity from scratch. The 
data are available for five categories of firm size. We use three measures of entrepreneurship: 
• The birth rate of new companies. It is computed as the number of firm births relative 
to the number of active companies.19 This indicator is derived per country, year, 
sector, and size category.  
• The share of self employment. This is computed as the number of active firms with 
zero employees divided by total employment. It is derived per country and year. 
• The birth of self employment. It is obtained by dividing the number of firm births with 
zero employees by total employment.  
Previous empirical studies have primarily used measures of the share of self-
employment in the labour force (our second measure), although dynamic measures on 
business entry have been used by some studies (our first and third measure). Table 4.1 shows 
the averages of these three indicators per country. The first column of Table 4.1 shows that 
the average birth rate was 9.6% per year. It differs widely across countries though, from a low 
average birth rate in Switzerland of 3.6% per year, to a high rate in Latvia of 16.0%. For most 
countries, the birth rate lies somewhere between 7 and 12%.  
                                                 
19 For small countries and sectors with a small number of active companies, the reported births rates were 
sometimes extremely high. We eliminated observations for which the birth rate was more than the sample mean 
plus two times the standard deviation. In practice, this means a maximum birth rate of around 32%. 
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The second column in Table 4.1 reports the share of self employment in the economy. 
On average, it equals 6.3%, varying from 0.6% in Latvia to 15.0% in Czech Republic. The 
birth of self employment on total employment, reported in the third column of Table 4.1, is 
0.7% on average. Lithuania displays the lowest rate with 0.1% and Czech Republic the 
highest with 1.4%. The two indicators on self employment differ from the birth rate in that 
they measure (entry in) small businesses, rather than entrepreneurial entry in all firms. The 
correlation between the three indicators is therefore weak: between the indicator for firm birth 
and the birth of self employment, it is only 0.28; between the birth rate and the share of self 
employment it is even negative (− 0.14).20 
Table 4.1: Indicators for entrepreneurship and entry per country 
 Birth rate Self-employment share Birth of self-employed 
Belgium 7.4% 7.9% 0.6% 
Switzerland 3.6% n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 10.8% 15.0% 1.4% 
Denmark 9.3% 5.7% 0.6% 
Estonia* 13.7% 1.3% 0.4% 
Spain 9.6% 9.4% 1.0% 
Finland 8.1% 6.1% 0.6% 
United Kingdom 12.3% 1.6% 0.2% 
Hungary 13.1% 6.0% 1.0% 
Italy 8.1% 13.0% 1.3% 
Lithuania* 10.6% 0.7% 0.1% 
Luxembourg 11.8% 4.6% 0.8% 
Latvia* 16.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
Netherlands 9.3% 2.8% 0.4% 
Norway 11.1% 10.7% 1.0% 
Portugal* 7.9% 5.0% 0.4% 
Romania* 13.7% 0.9% 0.2% 
Sweden 6.7% 7.7% 0.6% 
Slovenia 7.4% 3.4% 0.3% 
Slovakia 12.1% 5.4% 1.1% 
    
Average 9.6% 6.3% 0.7% 
The data on the birth rate of companies are for 1998-2003 (except CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, RO, SI, SK: 2000-2003; 
CH: 2003; DK: 1998-2001; NL: 1999-2003). The average is the average across sector and time dimensions for 
each country. The birth rate of companies is the ratio of new companies to active companies. The self-
employment rate is the number of active companies with zero employees on total employment in the economy. 
The birth rate of self-employed is the ratio of companies with zero employees on total employment in the 
economy. The data for the share of self-employed are for 1997-2003 (except BE: 1997-2000; IT, NL: 1998-
2003; CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, RO, SI, SK: 2000-2003; NO: 2000-2001; DK: 1997-2001). The data for the birth 
rate of self-employed are for 1998-2003 (except BE: 1998-2000; CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, RO, SI, SK: 2000-2003; 
NO: 2000-2001; DK: 1998-2001; NL: 1999-2003). * For LT, LV (until 2002), EE, PT and RO only limited 
liability and partnership companies are included in firms with zero employee.  
 
                                                 
20 In computing these correlations, we exclude countries for which data collection differs from the norm (i.e. 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Portugal). 
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The business demography data distinguish 60 sectors. The indicator on the rate of firm 
births uses this sector dimension. To show the sectoral variation in birth rates, Table 4.2 
shows a more aggregated distinction into 12 broadly defined categories. We see that the birth 
rate runs between 5.9% for mining and utilities (electricity, gas and water) to 12.7% for the 
education sector. Overall, firm births tend to be relatively high in some the service sectors, 
such as the financial sector, hotels and restaurants and social activities. Table 4.2 also shows 
the birth rate for the five different categories of firm size. Size is measured here as the number 
of employees. Table 4.2 shows that the birth rate declines with size. The highest rate of birth 
is among firms without employees, where it equals 11.6%. The birth rate of companies with 
more than 20 employees is 1.3%. 
Table 4.2: The birth rate of new firms per sector and company size 
 Birth rate 
Mining 5.9% 
Manufacturing 6.9% 
Electricity, gas, water 5.9% 
Construction 10.9% 
Retail 8.1% 
Hotels and restaurants 10.0% 
Storage and communications 7.9% 
Financial 11.6% 
Estate and business 12.2% 
Education 12.7% 
Health and social 7.8% 
Other social activities 10.8% 
  
Zero employee 11.6% 
1 to 4 employees 8.5% 
5 to 9 employees 4.6% 
10 to 19 employees 3.4% 
20 and more employees 1.3% 
  
Weighted average 9.6% 
See notes table 4.1 
 
4.2 Degree of incorporation 
A second set of the Eurostat data on business demography in Europe provides information 
on the degree of incorporation. In particular, it divides the number of companies in three legal 
forms:  
• Personally owned firms that have no limit to personal liability. It reflects the sole 
proprietorships (SP).  
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• Private or publicly quoted joint stock companies with limited liability (LL) for those 
owning shares. This category captures corporations.  
• Partnerships, which consists of personally owned limited and unlimited liability 
partnerships. Included are also other level forms such as co-operatives and 
associations.  
To arrive at corporate shares, we divide the enterprises that are registered as limited 
liability (LL) companies by the sum of companies with limited liability (LL) and personal 
liability (SP), i.e. 
SPLL
LLCORP += . Hence, we do not use the information about the 
partnerships, which is a hybrid category of companies that can be taxed under either the 
corporate income tax or the personal income tax. 
The data contain information on the number of both active firms and enterprise births. 
Apart from the number of companies, there are also data on employment in each of the three 
legal forms, both for active and new firms. As indicators for the share of the corporate sector 
in the economy (CORP), we therefore look at:21 
• The corporate share in the total number of active firms. 
• The corporate share in the total number of new firms.  
• The corporate employment share of active firms. 
• The corporate employment share of new firms. 
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Table 4.3: Degree of incorporation per country 
 Number of firms Employment 
 (1) New (2) Active (3) new (4) active 
Switzerland 54.4% 43.2% 67.3% 76.1% 
Czech Republic 12.1% 13.1% 35.0% 62.9% 
Denmark 22.1% 28.6% 35.1% 78.4% 
Estonia a 72.3% 82.7% 93.8% 96.8% 
Spain 33.8% 33.5% 51.9% 75.5% 
Finland 28.8% 47.2% 52.6% 92.5% 
United Kingdom 61.0% 56.9% 73.0% 89.5% 
Hungary 23.0% 25.9% 48.7% 72.5% 
Italy 19.9% 17.3% 31.3% 64.3% 
Lithuania b 45.0% 46.6% 70.9% 80.7% 
Luxembourg 76.2% 69.3% 84.0% 91.4% 
Latvia c 49.9% 65.0% 79.3% 92.3% 
Netherlands 28.8% 41.4% 43.1% 87.2% 
Norway 29.7% 49.0% 48.3% 87.7% 
Sweden 25.9% 46.3% 35.8% 87.3% 
Slovenia d 26.1% 34.3% 37.9% 73.2% 
Slovakia 18.0% 20.7% 45.7% 71.8% 
Weighted average 36.8% 35.7% 58.6% 81.8% 
The data are for 1998-2003 (except CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, RO, SI, SK: 2000-2003; CH: 2003; DK: 1998-2001; 
NL: 1999-2003). The average is the average across sector and time dimensions for each country. The degree of 
incorporation is the ratio of new (or active) companies which are incorporated on the total number of new (or 
active) companies. Alternatively, the share of employment is the ratio of the number of people employed in new 
(or active) companies which are incorporated on the number of people employed in all new (or active) 
companies. Sole proprietorships are not included in the data for Portugal (from 2001) and Romania and are 
therefore eliminated from the table. a For Estonia, only sole proprietorships with at least 20 employees are 
included. b In Lithuania, self-employed entrepreneurs that do not have employee are not covered by the dataset. c 
For Latvia, the natural persons are included from 2002. d For Slovenia, additional forms of natural persons are 
included from 2002.  
 
The Eurostat data on corporate shares have the same coverage as the entrepreneurship 
data distinguished with respect to firm size.22 Table 4.3 reports the mean corporate share of 
business for the four indicators per country. It shows that the corporate share in terms of the 
number of companies (36% for active and 37% for new firms) is substantially smaller than the 
corporate share measured in terms of employment (82% for active firms and 59% for new 
firms). Hence, corporations on average employ more people than companies in the non-
corporate form. This holds in particular for active companies. Across countries, the degree of 
incorporation differs widely. For instance, in terms of the number of active companies, it 
moves from 13% in the Czech Republic to 69% in Luxembourg. In most countries, the 
corporate share is somewhere between 20 and 50%. In terms of employment, the corporate 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Each pair of these four indicators shows a high correlation, with a minimum of 0.66. 
22 The subset that distinguishes legal form of companies does not report the size classes. Portugal and Romania 
do not report sole proprietorships and are thus eliminated from the sample. For Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, the 
data contain a structural break in 2001 due to a different way of data collection. We control for this via dummy 
variables in the regressions.  
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share of active firms exceeds 60% in all countries and is even over 90% for Finland, and 
Luxembourg.23 
Table 4.4: Degree of incorporation per sector 
  Number of firms Share of employment 
Sector NACE New Active New Active 
Mining C 67.3% 66.6% 88.9% 94.9% 
Manufacturing D 40.6% 44.5% 77.5% 92.1% 
Electricity, gas, water E 69.0% 80.9% 91.0% 99.6% 
Construction F 29.4% 31.1% 51.4% 71.3% 
Retail G 31.9% 31.0% 50.2% 76.3% 
Hotels and restaurants H 26.2% 24.8% 46.2% 69.3% 
Storage and comm.. I 30.9% 26.9% 56.8% 86.2% 
Financial J 38.6% 41.3% 69.5% 94.5% 
Estate and business 
K  
(excp. K7415) 49.2% 46.5% 66.4% 81.0% 
Education M 26.8% 35.9% 46.7% 90.7% 
Health and social N 20.6% 18.5% 53.2% 77.8% 
Other social activities O 31.0% 33.2% 56.6% 76.4% 
      
Weighted average  36.8% 35.7% 58.6% 81.8% 
See notes for table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the mean of the four measures for the degree of incorporation per 
sector. In general, we observe that the incorporation rate in terms of company numbers is 
relatively high in mining (67% of active firms) and in utilities (81%). It is small in 
construction and many service sectors (Hotels and restaurants, Health and social work, Social 
activities, Retail). In terms of employment, some of the service sectors show a higher 
corporate share, e.g. in education and financial.  
 
4.3 Tax variables 
The choice regarding entrepreneurship and legal form primarily applies to small firms. 
For most of these companies, the choice involves a discrete decision. Therefore, not the 
marginal tax on business, but the average effective tax burden will matter. As argued by 
Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), the statutory corporate tax on small business is a good 
approximation for the average tax burden if profits are large. As the income from 
entrepreneurial effort and the labour that an entrepreneur supplies to his company is generally 
included in the business income, profitability indeed tends to be high. Hence, the statutory 
corporate tax rate is likely to be a good approximation of the average effective tax burden on 
the income of small businesses. 
                                                 
23  The rates for Estonia and Latvia are distorted by the data collection. See note to the table. 
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Table 4.5: Tax rates per country in 2003. 
 
(1) 
 
CT for small 
businesses 
(2) 
 
Dividend 
relief system 
(3) 
 
Dividend 
tax  
(4) 
Top 
personal 
income tax 
(5) 
Average 
income 
tax 
(6) 
 
Progressivity 
index 
Belgium 24.28% DIT 15% 53.5% 20.4% .58 
Switzerland 21.74% ITC 35% 40.46% n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 31% DIT 15% 32% 10.1% .76 
Denmark 30% DTC 28% 59.7% 37.2% .64 
Estonia 0% Exemption 26% 26% 14.5% .87 
Spain 30% ITC 15% 45% 10.3% .61 
Finland 29% DIT 29% 54% 22.7% .60 
United Kingdom 19% 2/8 ITC 0% 40% 14.6% .70 
Hungary 19.64% DIT 20% 40% 14.1% .70 
Italy 38.25% DIT 12.5% 45% 19.4% .68 
Lithuania 13% None 15% 33% 16.1% .80 
Luxembourg 28.3% DTC 20% 38.95% 11.0% .69 
Latvia 15.2% DIT 0% 25% 14.4% .88 
Netherlands 29% DTC 25% 52% 9.9% .53 
Norway 28% ITC 0% 28% 20.2% .90 
Portugal 22% 50% exem. 15% 40% 9.9% .67 
Romania 25% DIT 5% 40% n.a. n.a. 
Sweden 28% DIT 30% 55% 24.0% .59 
Slovenia 25% 60% DTC 25% 50% 10.9% .56 
Slovakia 25% DIT 15% 38% 7.4% .67 
       
Average 24%  17.3% 41.8% 16% .69 
Source: Structures of taxation systems, IBFD and own calculations. The statutory rates include all local taxes 
and surcharges. The average tax excludes social security contributions. The progressivity index is computed as 
the ratio of (1-top rate)/(1-average rate), therefore a higher value indicates less progressivity. DIT: Dual Income 
Tax, ITC: Indirect Tax Credit, DTC: Direct Tax Credit. 
 
Some countries adopt progressive systems for the corporate tax by applying reduced 
rates for low levels of profit. Since our focus is on small businesses, the reduced rates will 
probably have an important impact on the choice of legal form. We therefore use the reduced 
rates for Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
intermediate rate (20% or 19%) for the UK as our measure for the corporate income tax; the 
other countries do not feature reduced rates. The corporate tax rate per country for 2003 is 
presented in the first column of table 4.5. We see that the mean corporate tax on small 
business is 24%. It ranges from zero for Estonia to 38.25% in Italy. 
In most countries, the corporate tax is not the only tax that bears on equity income 
from corporations. For instance, under the classical system of corporate income taxation, the 
personal income tax (on profit after corporate tax) should be added to the tax levied at the 
corporate level. In Europe, countries adopt a variety of regimes to avoid such double taxation 
of corporate income, including dual income tax systems (with reduced rates on equity 
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income), indirect tax credits, direct imputation credits and full exemptions. The second 
column of Table 4.5 shows this for 2003. Still, it is unclear to what extend this tax on 
dividends affects the effective tax burden on the corporate form, since small companies 
usually have other ways to distribute profits. Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), for instance, 
determine the effective personal tax on equity income by a weighted average of the tax on 
dividends and the tax on capital gains, where the weight is determined by the average 
dividend payout ratio. The weight on the capital gains tax is adjusted as tax deferral and the 
tax exemption of some types of capital gains provide relief. Mackie-Mason and Gordon 
(1997) compute the accrual equivalent of these gains at more than ¾ of the capital gains. 
Hence, capital gains taxes hardly seem to play a role for the personal tax on equity income. 
Goolsbee (2004) argues that this means that a zero tax on equity income at the personal level 
is probably the most accurate since small businesses usually pay very few dividends. This is 
supported by recent evidence on dividend payout ratios of De Angelo et al. (2004). We 
therefore take the corporate tax as a benchmark indicator for the tax on the corporate sector in 
estimating equations (3.4) and (3.8). As a check on the robustness of this assumption, we also 
explore a regression in which the dividend tax is added to it. Thereby, we assume that 30% of 
net equity income (i.e. the average dividend payout ratio according to De Angelo et al., 2004) 
is taxed under the dividend tax as reported in the third column of Table 4.5. Thereby, we also 
take account of the dividend relief system.  
For the personal income tax that applies to sole proprietorships, we follow Gordon and 
Mackie-Mason (1997) and Goolsbee (2004) by using the top personal income tax rate in 
regressions for organizational form. It is presented in the fourth column of Table 4.5. It ranges 
in 2003 from 25% in Latvia to almost 60% in Denmark. In the regressions on 
entrepreneurship, we make a distinction between the average tax burden and the degree of tax 
progression. As a measure for the average tax burden, we take the implicit tax on labour as 
obtained from Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union. Thereby, we 
exclude social security contributions, which often do not apply to the self employed. It is 
presented in the fifth column of Table 4.5. The final column in Table 4.5 presents the 
coefficient of relative income progression, which serves as our measure for tax progression. 
We see that tax progression ranged in 2003 from highly progressive in the Netherlands (0.53) 
to lightly progressive in Norway (0.90).  
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4.4 Control variables 
In the regression on entrepreneurship, we control for a number of variables that 
possibly affect the self-employment rate or entry into business. The first variable is an 
indicator for the functioning of the capital market, defined as the ratio between the deposit 
and the lending rate. It is as taken from the International Financial Statistics published by the 
International Monetary Fund. A better functioning capital market (i.e. a lower ratio) is thought 
to raise entrepreneurship as it should be easier to get funds for setting up a business. The 
second variable is an index for the administrative hurdles to starting a business as perceived 
by entrepreneurs in a country. It is based on a survey reported in the annual reports on 
Economic Freedom of the World published by the Fraser Institute, which asks entrepreneurs 
whether administrative procedures are an important obstacle to start a new business. The third 
variable is the death rate of new companies, which is used as a proxy for firm turnover in the 
regression for the birth rate. In that regression, we also include the percentage change in 
employment in the economy to capture business cycle effects.  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Taxation and firm birth 
Table 5.1 presents regression results on the impact of taxation on three indicators of 
entrepreneurship according to equation (3.4). The first indicator is the birth rate of new 
companies. The regression uses the rate of firm births for the full panel of years, countries, 
sectors and size classes. It comprises almost 12,000 observations. Regression (1) includes 
dummies to capture industry fixed effects, the fixed effects for the size classes and some 
dummies to control for differences in data collection. Table 5.1 shows that the quality of the 
banking system, measured by the interest spread exerts a significant effect on company 
creation. In addition, the index for the ease of startup, the death rate and the change in 
employment all have a significant positive impact on firm entry, as expected. As to the tax 
variables, we see from Table 5.1 that both the corporate tax and the personal tax rate 
significantly reduce the birth rate. This provides ground for the claim that taxes exert adverse 
effects on entrepreneurial entry. The coefficient for the corporate tax is slightly lower than for 
the personal tax, which is consistent with the fact that new firms are in majority small and 
unincorporated. The indicator for tax progression enters with a positive sign, which suggests 
that more progression (i.e. a smaller value of the RIP) reduces entrepreneurial entry. This is 
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consistent with our theoretical predictions as well as previous empirical analysis on tax 
progression and entrepreneurship.24 
The second and third columns in Table 5.1 explore alternative indicators for 
entrepreneurship. They reflect the rate of self employment and entry into self-employment 
rather than overall business entry. The indicators are defined on a more aggregate level than 
the birth rates, i.e. they do not differ per sector and size category but only per year and 
country. Accordingly, the number of observations is reduced to 54 and 52, respectively. The 
results for the alternative indicators differ from those for the birth rate. First, we see that the 
coefficients for the income tax variable and the degree of tax progression have the same sign 
in regressions (2) and (3), although their magnitudes in regression (3) are much smaller than 
in regression (2). This is due to the definitions of the dependent variables, as new firms make 
up about 10% of the active ones. Second, the results differ from regression (1) in that the 
corporate income tax exerts a significant positive impact (model (2)) or an insignificant effect 
(model (3)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 We also explored alternative specifications for (3.4), such as log models and lags for the independent 
variables. This yields similar conclusions as the regressions in Table 5.1. Regressions with a squared tax term 
provide ground for a U-shaped pattern of taxes and firm births, as was also found by Garret and Wall (2006). 
Also when we add the dividend tax to the tax burden on corporate income, the results remain unaffected. We 
also test for random industry and size effects and found that a Hausman test does not reject this specification 
neither for industry (based on NACE sub-categories) nor for size. However, the Akaike Information Criteria 
suggest that the fixed effect model is a better specification in both cases (based on Maximum likelihood 
estimation). When estimating random effects, the corporate tax variable, the personal tax variable and the 
progressivity variable are relatively unaffected with respectively -.060, -.067 and 7.474 and are all significant at 
1% level (except corporate tax which is significant at 5%). Finally, we correct for clustering effects, by allowing 
that error terms are more closely correlated within countries and industries or within countries and sizes than 
across individual observations. In the case of industry clustering, all tax variables remain highly significant and 
with the expected sign. The corporate tax variable, the personal tax variable and the progressivity variable 
become respectively -.157, -.082 and 6.495. In the case of size clustering, the respective values are -.201, -.075 
and 8.962 but the personal income tax becomes insignificant. All clustering regressions use a compound 
symmetry structure for the covariance matrix and Huber-White robust standard errors. 
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Table 5.1: Regression results on taxation and entrepreneurship 
 (1) 
Birth rate of new 
companies 
(2) 
Rate of self 
employment 
(3) 
Birth of self 
employment 
Intercept 11.523*** 
(.998) 
-8.935** 
(4.276) 
-1.420* 
(.757) 
Corporate tax rate -.060*** 
(.019) 
.149** 
(.059) 
.007 
(.008) 
Average personal tax rate -.067*** 
(.014) 
-.167*** 
(.039) 
-.025*** 
(.0067) 
Progressivity 7.482*** 
(1.154) 
16.262*** 
(6.057) 
3.543*** 
(1.124) 
Interest spread -.594*** 
(.138) 
1.938*** 
(.437) 
.103 
(.069) 
Startup .191*** 
(.040) 
.071 
(.164) 
.018 
(.016) 
Death rate .109*** 
(.026) 
  
Change in employment .117** 
(.060) 
  
Adj-R² .361 .759 .669 
Number obs. 11,891 54 52 
Data is for 2000-2003. All regressions use a linear model. Regression (1) uses ‘Birth rate’ as dependent variable, 
which is the ratio of the number of new companies created in year t on the number of active companies in year t. 
Regression (2) uses the ratio of the number of active companies with zero employee on total employment in the 
economy as dependent variable. Regression (3) uses the ratio of the number of new companies with zero 
employees on total employment in the economy as dependent variable. All regressions include dummies to 
correct for country and time structural breaks in the data collection. Regression (1) also includes industry and 
size dummies. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. White Heteroskedasticity-
consistent errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
 
 The regressions for the alternative indicators (2) and (3) are based on fewer 
observations than model (1). Moreover, their interpretation is somewhat different than model 
(1), as models (2) and (3) refer to (entry in) small businesses without employees, rather than 
entry of all companies. This can explain the different effect of the corporate tax. In particular, 
in many countries the limited liability form is only available for companies with a certain 
number of associates and a relatively high value of capital. Therefore, zero-employee 
companies are mainly sole proprietorships which are taxed at the personal income tax. A 
higher corporate tax rate improves the competitive advantage of these small firms relative to 
the large firms and thus acts as an incentive to small business, i.e. it increases the second and 
third (although not significantly in this case) indicator for entrepreneurship but not the first. 
As the different regression results suggest different responses by small and large companies to 
changes in the corporate tax rate, we explore this further by carrying out regressions of the 
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birth rate of new companies per size category. Table 5.2 shows the results from these 
regressions. 
Table 5.2: Regression results on taxation and firm birth per size category 
 (1) 
0 employee 
(2) 
1 to 4 
employees 
(3) 
5 to 9 
employees 
(4) 
10 to 19 
employees 
(5) 
20 and more 
employees 
Intercept 5.130** 
(2.578) 
5.494*** 
(1.640) 
.376 
(1.845) 
1.648 
(1.729) 
-1.670** 
(.717) 
Corporate tax rate -.078 
(.055) 
-.138*** 
(.033) 
-.014 
(.037) 
.006 
(.034) 
-.018 
(.018) 
Average personal 
tax rate 
-.248*** 
(.045) 
-.024 
(.029) 
-.059* 
(.032) 
-.065*** 
(.023) 
-.011 
(.014) 
Progressivity 17.553*** 
(5.309) 
6.667*** 
(1.852) 
6.245** 
(2.756) 
4.413* 
(2.482) 
6.208*** 
(.926) 
Interest spread -.408 
(.416) 
-1.036*** 
(.255) 
-.749*** 
(.261 
-.981*** 
(.221) 
-.442*** 
(.107) 
Startup .569*** 
(.126) 
.017 
(.079) 
.285*** 
(.086) 
.055 
(.072) 
.053 
(.035) 
Death rate -.064 
(.049) 
.113 
(.071 
.030 
(.041) 
.136** 
(.058) 
.061** 
(.025) 
Change in 
employment 
.008 
(.182) 
.250** 
(.113 
.167 
(.116 
.166 
(.112) 
-.063 
(.151) 
Adj-R² .341 .302 .155 .108 .092 
Number obs. 2,432 2,467 2,378 2,290 2,324 
Data is for 2000-2003 The dependent variable ‘Birth rate’ is the ratio of the number of new companies created in 
year t on the number of active companies in year t. All regressions use a linear model and include size dummies, 
industry dummies as well as dummies to correct for country and time structural breaks in the data collection. 
Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 Table 5.2 reveals that the corporate and personal income tax variables tend to reduce 
the rate of firm birth. The magnitude and sign of the tax variables differs among size classes 
though. In particular, we find that the coefficient for the personal tax is the highest for 
companies with zero employees. The corporate tax appears insignificant for this category. 
Hence, entry of these companies is affected more by personal than corporate taxes as most of 
them probably enter as sole proprietorships. Tax progression exerts the largest impact on 
small firms, although this effect appears to be robust among the different size classes. Hence, 
risk factors seem to carry more weight in the decision of small entrepreneurs to enter into 
business. For companies with 1-4 employees, we observe a different effect of corporate 
relative to personal taxes. Indeed, while the corporate tax is now significant and large, the 
personal tax is smaller and only significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, entry of somewhat 
larger companies is affected more by corporate taxes and less by income taxes, probably 
because more firms enter in the corporate form. For companies with more than 4 employees, 
the tax coefficients are mixed but often insignificant. It suggests that entry of these firms is 
not heavily influenced by tax factors.  
 36
Overall, the regressions for entrepreneurship mimic previous research findings in that 
they give a somewhat mixed picture of the tax effects. Personal taxes and tax progression 
seem to significantly reduce the rate of firm births, the rate of self-employment and entry into 
self-employment, although only firm birth in small companies is significantly affected. The 
corporate tax exerts mixed effects, i.e. it reduces firm births, raises the rate of self 
employment and exerts an insignificant impact on the birth of self employment. This suggests 
that corporate taxation affects entrepreneurship in small businesses very differently from 
larger firms. This is confirmed by our estimates for different size classes. 
 
5.2 Taxation and organizational form 
Table 5.3 shows our regression results for the degree of incorporation according to 
equation (3.8). In the regressions, we include sector dummies and country or year dummies if 
structural breaks have been reported in the data. The table shows the impact of the difference 
in the personal tax and the corporate tax on the four indicators for the degree of incorporation.  
Table 5.3 Regression results on taxation and incorporation 
 (1) 
Degree of 
incorporation of 
new companies 
(2)  
Share of 
incorporated 
companies in total 
employment 
created by new 
companies 
(3)  
Degree of 
incorporation of 
active companies 
(4) 
Share of 
incorporated 
companies in total 
employment in 
active companies 
Intercept .322*** 
(.013) 
.561*** 
(.016) 
.346*** 
(.012) 
.771*** 
(.013) 
Difference in taxes .594*** 
(.055) 
.615*** 
(.084) 
.932*** 
(.050) 
.673*** 
(.070) 
Adj-R² .423 .344 .451 .331 
Number obs. 3,354 2,412 3,671 2,098 
The data are for 1997-2003. The degree of incorporation is the number of firms in limited liability form divided 
by the number of firms in limited liability or in sole proprietorship form. All regressions use a linear model and 
include industry dummies as well as dummies to correct for country and time structural breaks in the data 
collection. The difference in taxes is computed as the difference between the top marginal personal income tax 
rate and the statutory corporate tax rate applicable to small companies. Detailed variable definitions and data 
sources are given in Appendix A. White Heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
We see from Table 5.3 that the coefficient for the tax difference is positive and 
significant at the 1% confidence level for each indicator. This is consistent with income 
shifting from the personal to the corporate tax base in response to a lower corporate tax 
relative to the personal tax. The first two columns refer to the incorporation rate of new 
companies. They show that the magnitude of the tax effect is very similar for the firm and 
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employment shares in the corporate sector. Apparently, taxes do not affect large and small 
newly created firms differently in their organizational form choice, possibly because most 
newly created firms are small. The third and fourth columns of Table 5.3 refer to active 
companies. These coefficients are larger than for the new firms, which suggests that existing 
firms are more responsive in their legal form choice than are newly created companies 
(which may start as small proprietorships and later change into the corporate form). For 
active companies, the coefficient for the company share is larger than for the employment 
share. Hence, small active firms are more responsive to taxes than large active firms. The 
latter probably do not always consider the non-corporate form due to large non-tax benefits 
of incorporation. 
To better understand what the marginal coefficients in Table 5.3 imply for corporate 
tax policy, we compute the elasticity of the corporate tax base. The underlying assumption is 
that the corporate shares of (new or active) firms or employment serve as good indicators for 
the corporate share of total business income. As larger firms are more likely to be 
incorporated than small firms, the employment share probably better serves this purpose than 
the number of firms.25 To obtain the semi-elasticities of the tax base, we divide the marginal 
coefficients for the tax variable in Table 5.3 by the respective sample means of the corporate 
income share, as reported in Table 4.3. The resulting semi-elasticity measures the percentage 
change in the corporate tax base in response to a 1%-point change in the tax differential 
between corporate and the non-corporate sector. If we do this, we find the following semi-
elasticities of the corporate tax base: 1.6 for the number of new firms; 2.6 for the number of 
existing firms; 1.0 and 0.8 for the employment shares of new and existing firms respectively.   
                                                 
25 Goolsbee (2004) reports corporate shares of sales and employment and finds that these are very similar.  
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Table 5.4. Regressions on degree of incorporation per sector. 
The data are for 1997-2003. The degree of incorporation is the number of firms in limited liability form divided by the number of firms in limited liability or in sole 
proprietorship form. All regressions use a linear model and include dummies to correct for country and time structural breaks in the data collection. The difference in taxes is 
computed as the difference between the top marginal personal income tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate applicable to small companies. Detailed variable definitions 
and data sources are given in Appendix A. White Heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 
percent, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Mining 
(2)   
Electricity. 
 gas. water  
(3) 
Manufact. 
(4) 
Construct. 
(5) 
Retail 
(6) 
Storage and  
communications 
(7) 
Financial 
(8) 
Estate and 
business 
(9) 
Computer 
(10) 
Research and 
Development 
(11) 
Professions 
(12) 
Social 
Intercept .636*** 
(.056) 
.543*** 
(.061) 
.356*** 
(.024) 
.130*** 
(.029) 
.202*** 
(.019) 
.355*** 
(.048) 
.441*** 
(.091) 
.475*** 
(.051) 
.243*** 
(.027) 
.067 
(.050) 
.248*** 
(.024) 
.183*** 
(.031) 
Difference  
in taxes 
-.014 
(.311) 
1.334*** 
(.292) 
.378*** 
(.118) 
.645*** 
(.142) 
.360*** 
(.093) 
.527** 
(.228) 
1.311*** 
(.413) 
.594** 
(.250) 
.866*** 
(.131) 
1.975*** 
(.259) 
.641*** 
(.121) 
.585*** 
(.162) 
Adj-R² .180 .238 .370 .831 .552 .315 .119 .262 .362 .420 .425 .401 
Number obs. 81 87 745 57 559 319 154 159 378 55 444 316 
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Table 5.5. Robustness regressions on degree of incorporation. 
 
 (1) 
Semi-log 
model 
(2) 
Log-log 
model 
(3) 
Squared tax 
(4) 
Alternative 
tax 
(5) 
Lead tax 
(6) 
All dummies 
(7) 
Dividend tax 
(8) 
Random 
industry 
effects 
(9) 
Clustering 
Intercept -1.476*** 
(.046) 
-.502*** 
(.043) 
.212*** 
(.016) 
.307*** 
(.013) 
.330*** 
(.014) 
.040 
(.038) 
.379*** 
(.012) 
.345*** 
(.039) 
.144*** 
(.036) 
Difference  
in taxes 
2.343*** 
(.204) 
.287*** 
(.019) 
3.083*** 
(.219) 
.616*** 
(.048) 
.535*** 
(.054) 
3.170*** 
(.142) 
.374*** 
(.055) 
.594*** 
(.057) 
.751*** 
(.117) 
Square 
difference in 
taxes 
  -8.608*** 
(.739) 
      
Adj-R² .322 .350 .446 .432 .465 .480 .412   
Number obs. 3,311 3,269 3,354 3,354 2,379 3,354 3,354 3,354 3,354 
The data are for 1997-2003. The degree of incorporation is the number of firms in limited liability form divided by the number of firms in limited liability or in sole 
proprietorship form. The difference in taxes is computed as the difference between the top marginal personal income tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate applicable to 
small companies.  All regressions use a linear model, except for regressions (1) and (2). All regressions also include industry dummies as well as dummies to correct for 
country and time structural breaks in the data collection. In addition, regression (6) contains all time and country fixed effects. Regression (3) also includes the squared value 
of this variable. Regression (4) uses use the ratio of the difference between these two rates on one minus the corporate tax rate as independent variable. Regression (5) uses 
the lead of this difference in taxes variable. Regression (7) uses the difference between the top personal income tax rate and the effective tax rate on distributed profit, taking 
into account taxation at both the corporate and personal level. Regression (8) looks at random effects for industry and is estimated via Maximum Likelihood. Finally, 
regression (9) is also estimated via Maximum Likelihood and uses a compound symmetry structure for the covariance matrix to correct for country and industry clustering 
effects and Huber-White robust standard errors. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. White Heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are given 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
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The semi-elasticity of the tax base can be compared to previous studies. For instance, 
Goolsbee (2004) adopts the same specification as we do and considers alternative indicators 
for the corporate share of business, including firms, employment and sales. His basic results 
suggest a tax base elasticity of 1.1 for the number of firms and 0.4 for employment and sales. 
This is somewhat smaller than our elasticities. They are consistent in the sense that it finds a 
smaller response for the employment share than for the firm share. MacKie-Mason and 
Gordon (1997) use a slightly different specification in that they scale their tax term by (1-Tc). 
Moreover, they consider the share of corporate assets. With a corporate share of 2/3, their 
semi-elasticity would be somewhere between 0.03 and 0.2, which is smaller than what we 
find. Gordon and Slemrod (2002) consider income shifting in the US. Their findings suggest 
that a 1%-point increase in the tax differential between corporate and personal taxes increases 
reported labour income by 3%. Fuest and Weichenrieder (2003) conclude that a 1%-point 
reduction in the corporate tax rate increases the fraction of corporate savings in total private 
savings by some 2.6%. Our estimates are slightly smaller than these latter estimates. 
Table 5.4 presents regression results on legal form choice per sector for the number of 
new firms. Again, we control for structural breaks in the data through dummies. Significant 
positive coefficients (at the 5% level) are reported for all sectors but mining. The coefficients 
for utilities, financial firms and R&D are large, suggesting that these firms are relatively 
responsive to taxes. 
Table 5.5 explores the robustness of our findings for alternative specifications, again 
for the number of new firms. The regressions include single and double log specifications, a 
squared tax term, and an alternative tax term that divides the tax difference by (1-Tc) as was 
done by MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997). Each of the regressions suggests a positive and 
significant impact of the tax term. Computing the associated semi-elasticity of the tax base 
evaluated at sample means yields values of 1.2 for the log model, 2.3 for the semi-log model 
and 1.7 for the alternative tax. This fits well with semi-elasticity of 1.6 for the linear model. 
The tax base elasticity in the model with the squared tax term is extremely sensitive to the tax 
differential, but equals 0.8 at the sample means. The fifth column presents the lead of tax 
variable, which captures possible anticipation effects. It yields a positive but slightly smaller 
coefficient for the tax term than the original regression in Table 5.3. If we introduce country 
and year dummies, the sixth column of Table 5.5 shows that the tax term remains significant 
and positive but the value becomes implausibly large. As the dummies take away much of the 
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cross-section variation that is meant to identify the impact of taxes on legal form, we do not 
prefer this specification.26 Column 7 of Table 5.5 considers an alternative tax measure for 
corporate firms where we add the personal tax on dividends (see section 4). Including the 
personal tax reduces the magnitude of the tax term by forty percent, but the tax term remains 
significant at the 1% confidence level. Next, we test for random industry effects. Because we 
have three dimensions (countries, year and industry) and that industry is an aggregate of 
several NACE categories, we have more than one observation per country and industry. 
Therefore, our statistical package does not allow directly carrying out a Hausman test. We go 
around this problem in two ways. First, we estimate random effects based on the sub-
categories of industry (NACE). With a p-value of .999, the test does not reject random 
industry effects. In addition, we estimate two models with respectively fixed and random 
industry effects via maximum likelihood estimation. The results of the random effect model 
are reported in column 8. The coefficient for the difference in taxes is unchanged compared to 
fixed effects and highly significant. The comparison of the Akaike Information Criteria 
suggests that the fixed effects model is a better one. Finally, in regression (9), we correct for 
cluster effects within country and industry pairs. The coefficient of the tax variable 
considerably increases. A likelihood ratio test (not reported) indicates a significant 
improvement over the null model consisting of homogeneous residual errors. 
 
5.3. Implications for corporate tax policy 
We now infer what our estimates imply for the impact of tax policies for corporate tax 
revenue and the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. Thereby, we focus on the channel of income 
shifting through the choice of legal form, since the impact on entrepreneurship appears to be 
less robust than the effect on incorporation.  
Corporate tax revenue (R) equals the corporate tax rate (Tc) times the tax base (B). In 
terms of changes, denoted by ∆, the impact of corporate tax on corporate revenue can be 
written as: 
]1[
B
B
T
T
BTBTBTR
c
c
ccc
Δ
Δ+Δ=Δ+Δ=Δ    (5.1) 
                                                 
26 We also analyzed other control variables that differ across countries and years, such as the interest spread and 
the startup costs. These do not significantly contribute to the explanation of corporate share variations.  
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In (5.1), the term ∆TcB reflects the ex-ante revenue effect from a change in the 
corporate tax rate. The ex-post revenue effect would be equivalent to this if the tax base 
would remain constant (i.e. if ∆B = 0). If the corporate tax base responds to changes in the 
corporate tax rate, the term between square brackets on the right-hand side of (5.1) reveals 
that the ex-post revenue effect (∆R) differs from the ex-ante effect (∆TcB). We use the semi-
elasticity of the corporate tax base,
B
BΔ , from the regressions on the degree of incorporation to 
determine the ex-post revenue effect of corporate tax relief, taking account of income shifting. 
As we argued before, the employment share is a better indicator for the corporate share of 
business income than the firm share. We therefore take the semi-elasticity of 0.8 for the 
employment share of existing firms in our computations. According to (5.1), we need to 
multiply the semi-elasticity by the corporate tax rate. This is reported in Table 4.5. Imputing 
the mean corporate tax of 24% in expression (5.1) and considering a reduction in the 
corporate tax rate by 1%-point (i.e. ∆Tc = -1), the term between square brackets equals 0.82. It 
means that an ex-ante reduction in the corporate tax rate equivalent to one €, will cost only 82 
€-cents in terms of corporate tax revenue lost ex-post. Hence, 18 €-cents are regained through 
income shifting from the personal to the corporate tax base. This regain in corporate tax 
revenue comes at the expense of a decline in personal tax revenue (which is likely to exceed 
the regain in corporate tax revenue).  
Income shifting is not the only behavioural effect of corporate tax changes that affects 
the corporate tax base. De Mooij (2005) discusses several other effects, such as distortions in 
investment, the financial structure of companies, international investment location and the 
profit allocation by multinationals. He uses expression (5.1) to assess the revenue gains 
associated with corporate tax relief through these mechanisms. In particular, on the basis of a 
review of the empirical literature on various tax base elasticities, he finds that the largest 
revenue effects are related to the channels of foreign direct investment (revenue gain of 12 €-
cents for an average EU country) and international profit allocation (revenue gain of around 
30 €-cents for the Netherlands). Our estimates for profit shifting between the personal and the 
corporate tax base are of a similar magnitude as these other, international distortions imposed 
by corporate taxes. 
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5.4 Implications for the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio  
The semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base of 0.8 implies that the difference between 
personal and corporate taxes affects the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. To illustrate this, we take 
the average tax differential between the top personal tax and the reduced corporate tax in the 
EU-15 between 1991 and 2006. This so-called tax gap is equal to 17%. With a semi-elasticity 
of 0.8, this implies that the corporate tax base would on average be 13.5% broader than 
without such a tax gap. With an average corporate tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU-15 of 2.7% in 
2004, the tax gap is responsible for a revenue share of around 0.4% of GDP. Hence, without 
the tax gap the tax-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall from 2.7 to 2.3%. We call this difference 
the corporate tax gain from income shifting. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate the development of this corporate tax gain from 
income shifting in the EU-15 over time. In particular, Figure 5.1 demonstrates the 
development of the average tax gap between the top personal tax rate and the reduced 
corporate tax rate between 1991 and 2006. We see that this tax gap increased from around 
12%-points in the early 1990s towards more than 20%-points in recent years. This is 
primarily the result of decreasing corporate tax rates, which fell from an average of 41% to 
27%.  
Figure 5.1: Difference between the personal income and reduced corporate tax 
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GDP-weighted average of top personal tax minus reduced corporate tax in the EU-15 
Source: IBFD and own calculations 
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Figure 5.2: Actual and simulated developments of the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio  
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The impact of the rising tax gap on corporate tax revenue is shown in Figure 5.2. It 
demonstrates three alternative developments of the tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU-15 between 
1991 and 2004. The first is the development of the actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratio 
(‘Actual’). The second line in Figure 5.2 (“Without income shifting”) represents the simulated 
development under the assumption that the tax gap would have been zero in all years between 
1991 and 2004. It is constructed by subtracting the corporate tax revenue associated with 
income shifting (i.e. the tax base elasticity of 0.8 times the tax gap in each year) from the 
actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. The difference between the two lines can be interpreted as 
the corporate tax gain from income shifting. We see from Figure 5.2 that this corporate tax 
gain rose from around 0.25%-points of GDP in the early 1990s to 0.47%-points in 2004. 
Hence, income shifting can indeed explain part of the stabilization of corporate tax revenue 
since the early 1990s. The third line in Figure 5.2 (“Without tax changes”) shows the same 
development in an alternative manner. In particular, it demonstrates the simulated 
development of the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio if the tax gap between personal and corporate 
taxation would have remained unchanged since 1991. It is constructed by subtracting the 
additional income shifting induced by the rising tax gap since 1991 from the actual tax-to-
GDP ratio. The difference between this line and the actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratio yields 
direct insight in change of the corporate tax gain from income shifting. We see from Figure 
5.2 that this gain has gradually increased over time to around 0.2%-points in recent years. The 
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rising tax gap thus explains 0.2%-points of the stabilization of the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio 
since the early 1990s. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In the policy debate on tax competition in the European Union, the paradox of 
declining corporate tax rates and rising tax-to-GDP ratios casts doubts on how serious is the 
threat of tax competition for the public finances of Member States. This paper argues that 
simply looking at corporate tax-to-GDP ratios can be misleading as part of the revenue 
consequences of corporate tax relief shows up in lower personal tax revenue, rather than lower 
corporate tax revenue. Indeed, we explore two channels of income shifting from the personal 
towards the corporate tax base, induced by corporate tax cuts. One is increased 
entrepreneurship; the other is an increase in the degree of incorporation of companies.  
The results suggest that the impact of corporate taxes on entrepreneurship is 
ambiguous: while the corporate tax is found to reduce the rate of firm births, especially of 
medium sized companies, it exerts opposite effects on indicators for the degree of self-
employment. Hence, entry of small companies (with zero employees) is affected differently by 
corporate taxes than are larger companies. We find that the tax gap between personal and 
corporate tax rates exerts a significant positive effect on the degree of incorporation. This 
result is robust for alternative indicators and specifications.  
The estimates on incorporation suggest that the impact of income shifting in response 
to a larger tax gap is sizeable. Indeed, a one € ex-ante tax relief in corporate taxes costs only 
82 €-cents in terms of corporate tax revenue ex-post if the shifting of income towards the 
corporate tax base is taken into account. As lower corporate taxes may also broaden the 
corporate tax base through other channels such as investment, financial restructuring or the 
attraction of multinational profits, they may come along with higher corporate tax revenue. 
This suggests that countries may have passed the top of the Laffer curve in their corporate tax. 
Yet, we argue that this may be partly due to income shifting from the personal to the corporate 
tax. The Laffer curve may then not apply to aggregate revenue since the rise in corporate tax 
revenue comes at the expense of lower personal tax revenue. This qualifies the Laffer-curve 
effect and strengthens the case for a corporate tax as a backstop for the personal tax.  
Assessing the revenue consequences of tax competition by looking at corporate tax 
revenues is misleading as the revenue effects of lower corporate tax rates partly show up in 
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lower personal tax revenues. Our results can help explaining the part of the corporate tax rate-
revenue paradox, as the tax gap between personal and corporate tax rates has grown since the 
early 1990s. Using our regression results, we find that around 10% of the corporate tax-to-
GDP ratio was due to income shifting in the early 1990s but this share has grown to 17% in 
recent years due to the growing tax gap. Accordingly, income shifting has contributed to the 
stabilization of the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio by around 0.2%-point since the early 1990s.  
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Appendix (A): Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Birth rate of companies Number of companies born in year t on the number of companies active in year t for a specific 
country, year and sector (or aggregation of sectors).  A birth is defined as the creation of 
production factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved in the event. Birth 
do not include entries into the population due to mergers, break-ups, split-off or restructuring of 
a set of enterprises. It does not include entries into a sub-population resulting only from a 
change of activity. A birth occurs when an enterprise starts from scratch and actually starts 
activity. An enterprise creation can be considered an enterprise birth if new production factors, 
in particular new jobs, are created. If a dormant unit is reactivated within two years, this event is 
not considered a birth. Sole proprietorships are not included in the data for Portugal (from 2001) 
and Romania. In Estonia, only sole proprietorships with at least 20 employees are included. In 
Latvia and Slovenia, natural persons are included from 2002. An enterprise is active if it had 
either turnover or employment at any time during the reference period. 
Eurostat’s harmonized data 
collection on business 
demography. 
Self-employment rate (or 
birth) 
Number of active (or new) companies with zero employee divided by total employment. 
Employed persons are persons aged 15 and over  who during the reference week performed 
work, even for just one hour per week, for pay, profit or family gain or were not at work but had 
a job or business from which they were temporarily absent because of, e.g., illness, holidays, 
industrial dispute and education or training. Persons carrying out obligatory military service are 
not included 
Eurostat’s harmonized data 
collection on business 
demography. And Eurostat’s 
New Chronos database. 
Corporate tax rate Statutory corporate tax rate applicable to small companies. European Commission and 
Office of Tax Policy Research. 
Average personal tax rate Implicit personal income tax rate on labour.  European Commission and own 
calculations. 
Progressivity Ratio of one minus the top personal income tax rate on one minus the average personal income 
tax rate 
European Commission and own 
calculations. 
Interest spread Ratio of the deposit interest rate on the lending interest rate. International Financial Statistics 
(IMF). Lines 60. 
Startup 0-10 index taking higher values when administrative procedures become less of an important 
obstacle to starting a new business. 
Freedom of the World (Fraser 
Institute). Data are for 2000-2003 
Death rate Number of companies exiting business in year t on the number of companies active in year t for 
a specific country, year and sector (or aggregation of sectors). A death amounts to a dissolution 
of a combination of production factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved 
in the event. Deaths do not include exits from the population due to mergers, take-overs, break-
ups or restructuring of a set of enterprises. It does not include exits from a sub-population 
resulting only from a change of activity. An enterprise is included in the count of deaths only if 
it is not reactivated within two years. Equally, a reactivation is not counted as a birth. 
Eurostat’s harmonized data 
collection on business 
demography. 
Change in employment Percentage change in employment on year-on-year basis. Eurostat’s New Chronos 
database. 
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Variable Definition Source 
Degree of incorporation 
of companies. 
Number of companies in limited liability form divided by the number of companies in either 
limited liability of sole proprietorship form. This ratio can be computed for new or for active 
companies, as well as in number of companies or in number of employees. 
Eurostat’s harmonized data 
collection on business 
demography and own 
calculations. 
Difference in taxes Difference between the top personal income tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate 
applicable to small companies. 
European Commission, Office of 
Tax Policy Research and own 
calculations. 
Sectors Based on NACE-4digit classification, the have the following 12 large sectors and 60 sub-
sectors:  
1. mining (C): mining of energy (CA), mining except energy (CB);  
2. Manufacturing (D): food and beverage (DA), textile (DB), leather (DC), wood (DD), paper 
(DE), coke (DF), chemicals (DG), rubber and plastics (DH), non-metal minerals (DI), metals 
(DJ), machinery and equipment (DK), electrical and optical (DL), transport equipment (DM), 
manufacturing NEC (DN);  
3. utilities (E): energy supply (E40), collection and purification (E41);  
4. construction (F): construction (F45);  
5. retail (G, H): motor vehicules (G50), wholesale except motor (G51), retail non-specialised 
stores (G521), retail of food in specialized stores (G522), retail in specialized stores (G523-
G525), retail not in stores (G526), repair of personal goods (G527), hotels and campings (H551-
H552), restaurants and bars (H553-H554-H555);  
6. storage and communications (I): land transport (I60), water transport (I61), air transport 
(I62), support to transport activities (I63), post (I641), telecommunications (I642);  
7. financial (J): financial except insurance and pension (J65), insurance and pension (J66), 
support to financial activities (J67);  
8. estate and business (K70-K71): real estate (K70), renting of machinery (K71);  
9. computers (K72): hardware computer (K721), software computer (K722), data computer 
(K723), database activities (K724), repair of computers (K725), other computer activities 
(K726);  
10. R&D (K73);  
11. professions (K74): accounting and auditing (K741), architecture and engineering (K742), 
technical testing (K743), advertising (K744), labour recruitment (K745), investigation and 
security (K746), industrial cleaning (K747), business NEC (K748);  
12. social (M,N,O): education (M80), health and social work (N85), sewage, disposal and 
sanitation (O90), membership organizations (O91), cultural and sport activities (O92), other 
services (O93). 
Eurostat’s harmonized data 
collection on business 
demography and own 
aggregations. 
Gross Operating Surplus Gross Value added minus compensation of employees minus taxes on import and production 
plus subsidies on production (for total economy or for corporate sector). 
AMECO Database 
 
